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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 01/02/2008 Accident number: 544 
Accident time: 12:00 Accident Date: 02/03/2004 
Where it occurred: Ward 18, Dehsabz, 
Kabul Province  
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: None Name of source: [Name removed] 
Organisation: [Name removed]  




Date record created:  Date  last modified: 01/02/2008 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 




The report of this accident was made available in January 2008 by the demining group 
involved. Its conversion to a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. 
The substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original file is held 
on record. Text in [ ] is editorial. 
 
ACCIDENT REPORT 
[Demining group], KABUL SEPTEMBER 2003 
 
1. Objectives. 
The objectives with the current report are: 
To deliver the evidences to other staff within the organization. 
To draw the attention of other staff to 100% implementation of standards.       
 
2. General Information.          
Team/Site description: The incident happened with two deminers of EOD 8 during BAC of 
CDS after the demolition.  
Location of accident: Ward 18 Dehsabz, Kabul Province                           
Date & Time: March 2, 2004 at 12:00 hrs local time                                      
3. Particulars of injured person: 
Name: [Removed] 
Title: Deminer  
Date of birth: 1978 
Place of birth: Kandahar  
Blood group: B Rh –  
 
Name:  [Removed] 
Title: Deminer 
Date of birth:1976  
Place of birth: Kandahar 
Blood group: AB Rh -    
 
4.  Cause of the accident:  
Refer to the statement given by injured deminers, they were doing the BAC of the surrounding 
areas of the CDS after the demolition of 400 flares and one engine of Oragan Rocket that was 
demolished in two different pits. While collecting the demolished flares and scraps he touched 
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a flare that was half buried in the ground and when he left, it got fire and burnt his face and 
fore arms. The accident point is almost 20 meters far from the demolition pits.  
 
5. Brief description of injuries:      
[Victim No.1] has 3rd degree severe burn in his face, both forearms and right leg. 
[Victim No.2] has 4th degree minor burn in his face and right forearm. 
 
6. Chronological Overview of the Accident. 
Following describes the actions taken and the instructions given directly after the accident: 
At 1200  the accident happened .   
The nearest deminer of the same EOD team heard the incident and rushed to the incident 
point.  +05 sec. 
Paramedic started treating and doing the first aid to the injured.  +60 sec. 
Radio room of OPSC got the report.  +3 min.  
The injured Deminers were shifted to the ambulance after first aid and dressing +05 min. 
A delegation left from Kabul toward CDS for initial investigation.  +15 min. 
Operations were standing by in Bagram and Kabul. +45 min.      
SOO, TCM, Tech. Advisors left for the CDS to investigate the accident. +38 min. 
Arrival of injured from CDS to Emergency hospital in Kabul. +54 min. 
The emergency hospital considered the injured as ODP patients and did not accept them 
because of minor injuries and were shifted back to office.  +64 min. 
The delegation of initial investigation arrived back to OPSC.  +120 min  
The country director together with the delegation met the injured in office. + 180 min 
The accident was reported to UNMACA and [Demining group] Islamabad.  +190 min  
The injured were treated by MO in office and were sent back to Bagram base.  + 240 min   
 
7. Brief description of how the accident happened: 
The section leader 5 minutes after the demolition went to the demolition area for checking of 
the success demolition. When he was assured that the demolition is successful and there is 
no smoke and sound in the area he called the deminers who were looking for the security of 
the CDS to come and start the BAC of the surrounding areas. The deminers started BAC in a 
straight line with 2 meters in between each of them after 15 minutes from the demolition time. 
Approximately 20% of the area that they were doing BAC were checked which took 5 
minutes.  [Victim No.1] was the first man from the right and J[Victim No.2] was on his left 
while two other deminers were beside them. 
During the BAC operations while they were collecting the fragments and scraps [Victim No.1] 
found a flare that was not smoking and sound and were half buried in the ground.  When he 
picked up the flare by his right hand it took fire and burnt his face and forearms.  As the fire 
was strong it burnt face of [Victim No.2] too.  
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General Condition of the injured persons: 
The deminers were feeling well and they were not admitted in Emergency Hospital because 
of minor burnt in their bodies.  They were prescribed some medicines by the medical officer 
and were shifted to Bagram Compound for rest.  
 
8. Damaged Equipment: 
In this incident the uniform and the gloves of the deminers were damaged. 
 
9. Technical Evidence  
Based on the findings of investigation team from the accident point and shrapnel taken out 
from the wounds of the deminer, a flare has got fire and caused the injuries. 
 
Treatment: 
The 1 DM, 2 PAMs performed first aid in the accident, stabilized and prepared the injured for 
evacuation - more specifically: 
-  Put gel on the burnt area. 




Summarizing all factors mentioned above some procedures or regulations have been violated 
according to the current Demining SOPs within [Demining group]. Unfortunately there are no 
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eyewitnesses to the accident except the injured deminers them selves and the statement of 
them is not answering all the questions raised. 
As the flare was kicked out from the demolition and the possibility of risk was still in place 
therefore, the deminers should not touch the kicked out UXO without the permission of team 
or section leader. And also they must keep the specific distance between each other while 
doing BAC after the demolition. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 717 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 25 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not made available, Time to hospital: 54 minutes 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: None 
 




COMMENT: "3rd degree severe burn in his face, both forearms and right leg." No Medical 
report was made available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 718 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 27 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not made available. Time to hospital: 54 minutes 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
minor Arm 
minor Face 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because Victim No.1 
should not have picked up the thrown-out flare but apparently did not realise that this was 
dangerous. The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because if Victim 
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No.1 had been appropriately trained, he was not appropriately controlled while working in the 
field. 
The Victims were working without PPE. This is presumed because of the injuries received 
and the fact that their uniforms were damaged but no PPE was damaged. The photograph of 
the investigation showed men without PPE.  It may be that the demining group performed 
BAC and ordnance disposal tasks without wearing PPE, and that this was approved by the 
National Authority. However, given that most UXO accidents involve fuzes, it would always be 
worth wearing PPE. 
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